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Abstract 
This study evaluated the role of institutions in the management of public debt in Nigeria after the exit 
from the Paris club in 2006. It utilized both the institutional and macroeconometric frameworks. The 
institutional framework was anchored on the Debt Management Office Act of 2003 and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 2007 in which the two Acts of Parliaments provided a rule-based management of 
the public debt. Thus, the institutional analysis determined if the transition from discretionary to a rule-
based system had taken place while the macroeconometric framework account for the impacts of debt 
on the public sector financing of Nigeria. The study found that the country has not been able to transit 
from the discretionary to a rule-based fiscal system/operation since the exit from the Paris club. This is 
can be attributed to the non-strict adherence to the rules as contained in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 2007. This constraints to institutional change may also be linked to the conflicting interests/ 
asymmetrical relationship between the Debt Management office (DMO) and Fiscal Responsibility 
Commission (FRC) thereby limiting the abilities of the DMO to discharge their mandates. As a result, 
public debt stock and public debt service has grown significantly after the exit from the Paris Club. 
Therefore, this study recommends that the government should strictly comply with the provisions of 
Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on borrowing as is contained in 
the guidelines of DMO Act and FRA. 
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1. Introduction 
Public borrowing has been an important source of funding Nigeria’s national development 
plans. The federal government budget, the key driver of public spending, is often in deficit. The Federal 
deficit is financed through domestic and foreign borrowings. The size of the federal debt rose in the 
1970s and in the 1980s to the point that Nigeria was unable to finance the servicing of its public debt. 
Thus, Nigeria’s debt burden had serious consequences on the economy and the welfare of the citizens 
because external debt servicing crowds-out government expenditure on socio-economic development 
and poverty alleviation. It was in 2005 that the Federal Government exited the Paris Club through an 
agreement that hinged on Nigeria implementing an IMF monitored economic reform programme and a 
debt reduction under the Naples term and a debt buy–back at a market related discount on the remaining 
eligible debts after reduction. It was, thus, expected that the exit from the Paris Club would release 
revenue for socio-economic development and lead to poverty reduction.  
Before the debt relief, Nigeria owed a total of US$34 billion to its creditors. This amount 
accrued from penalties and interests during the 1980s and early 1990s when the military regime did not 
repay the debt. It was estimated that Nigeria was paying US$1.7 billion in debt service annually, which 
was 3 times larger than the budget for health sector (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005). In the late 70s and early 
80s, when oil prices fell at the same time interest rates rose, Nigeria faced the problem of debt overhang 
from 1982. By 1985, Nigeria’s debt servicing arrears started to accumulate (DMO, 2011). As at 31st 
December, 2005, the total public debt outstanding for Nigeria (external and securitized domestic debt) 
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stood at US$32billion only to its creditors. The greater share of Nigeria’s public debt over the whole 
period was external, with a gradual rise in the volume of external debt from 2001 to 2004. This was due 
to the accumulation of arrears, penalty charges and exchange rate movements, rather than new 
borrowings.  
In order to address this debt crisis, the Nigerian government made some effort. For instance, 
under the Brady Plan in 1992, Nigeria was able to conclude at the London club, an exchange deal for a 
substantial part of its commercial debt allowing for a discount of about 60%. However, the Paris Club 
arrangement for debt relief in the same year failed because Nigeria failed to return to democratic rule. 
After the restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999, new economic policies were put in place and 
similar conditions were recommended again. By this time the total bilateral debt owed to Paris Club 
members had increased tremendously due to interest arrears and penalties. The civilian government 
therefore, called for substantial debt reduction arrangement with the Paris Club to improve economic 
planning and growth. In 2005, a significant decrease in the total debt stock was observed. This is due 
to a 43% reduction in the external debt stock, which occurred as a result of the implementation of the 
agreed Paris Club debt deal during the year. On October 20th, 2005, a historical deal was struck that 
allowed Nigeria to fully exit from all obligations to its Paris Club creditors. The agreement was reached 
after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a Policy Support Instrument (PSI), which was 
implemented in two phases. "In the first phase, Nigeria agreed to pay arrears on all categories of debts 
and Paris Club of creditor’s grant of a 33% cancellation of eligible debt.  In the second phase, after the 
approval of the first review of the PSI by the Executive Board of the IMF, the Nigerian government 
was to pay amounts due under post-cutoff date debt. Thereafter, "Paris Club will grant a further tranche 
of cancellation of 34% on eligible debts, and Nigeria will buy back the remaining eligible debts." In 
real terms, the Paris Club will cancel US$18 billion of Nigeria’s debt, or about 60% per cent of the 
about US$30 billion owed to the Club. But the Paris Club will be paid "an amount of US$12.4 billion." 
Of this, US$6.3 billion paid to regularize arrears owed and another US$6.1 billion "to complete the exit 
strategy." At the end of negotiations and implementation of the exit agreement, Nigeria exited from the 
Paris Club in 2006. 
The Nigeria’s Debt Management Office Act of 2003 and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 
were enacted to provide institutional frameworks for more efficient and effective management of the 
public debt and the operations of the fiscal system. The Federal Government then began to accumulate 
new debt after the exit from the Paris Club.  The structure of debt also shifted in favour of domestic 
debt while the external debt shifted in favour of multilateral agencies. High public debt stems from 
persistent fiscal deficit. A widening domestic saving-investment gap, persisting demand for public 
expenditure accompanied by a debt-revenue ratio have been pushing up the size of public debt in 
Nigeria. The growing debt led to high taxes and put upward pressure on real interest rates, which may 
crowd out private investment (Ajayi, 2003). When government is no longer able to finance its deficit, 
it is forced to cut spending or raise revenues.  
In the wake of persistent saving-investment gap, export-import gap and fiscal deficit, a prudent 
public debt management is essential tools for sustainable macroeconomic stability of the Nigerian 
economy. Nigeria has run persistently large budget deficits in recent decades. These large and persistent 
budget deficits have generated considerable concern in Nigeria and there is a widespread perception 
that it will reduce growth, and could lead to a crisis if the deficit continues for long or become too large 
(Okonjo-Iweala, 2005).  
Consequently, in line with the Debt Management Office Act (2003) which has the objective of 
more efficiently managing Nigeria’s public debt; and Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) Acts aimed at 
institutionalizing rule based fiscal federalism in Nigeria; available data from DMO (2013), however, 
reveal changes in the structure of public debt; high and sustained growth in government; and public 
debt which raises the danger of a return to the period of debt overhang which prevailed before the Paris 
Club exit in 2006. Thus this study evaluates the role of institutions in the management of public debt in 
Nigeria after the exit from the Paris club in 2006. Following the introduction, section two dwell on the 
conceptual, theoretical and empirical literature reviews; section three was the methodology of the study; 
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and section four presented, analyses and discussions of the empirical results. And finally, section five 
give conclusions and recommendations of the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review  
There is an extensive literature on external debts covering rationale for contracting foreign 
debts, implications for the macro-economy and sustainability concerns. Theoretically, the dual gap 
theory proposed by Hollis Chenery (1996) and debt over-hang theory developed by Paul Krugman 
(1988) explains the link between debt accumulation and economic growth. On one hand, the dual Gap 
theory opined that economic growth depends on investment- saving nexus. Chenery argued that most 
less developed nations do not have sufficient savings (due to low per capita income) to match up with 
the necessary investment to ensure economic growth, they therefore resort to external finance to fill the 
saving investment gap. On the other hand, the debt overhang theory postulates that huge borrowing 
leads to high indebtedness, debt traps and slows down economic growth. Krugman argued that hoarded 
foreign debt stock leads to higher tax (tax disincentive) on future output and thus discourage any 
genuine investor from investing in that country. 
Public debt is an important means of bridging government financing gaps. Effective and 
efficient utilization of public debt can increase economic growth and help government achieve 
developmental and social objectives. However, public debt is also a doubled-edged sword. Excessive 
reliance on public debt and inappropriate public debt management raise enormous macroeconomic 
risks, impede economic growth, and hinders overall economic development. For example, high public 
debt demand can increase the domestic interest rate thereby crowding out private investment. For 
instance, empirically, Fosu (2007, 2008) applied a seemingly unrelated regression model to a panel of 
35 African countries for the period 1975–94 and concludes that the debt constraint has a negative impact 
on education and health expenditures. However, he does not consider allocations to other functional 
sectors in this study. To fill this gap, he extends the analysis to a multi-sector model and estimates a 
system of expenditure-share equations simultaneously involving the functional sectors (agriculture, 
capital, economic services, public investment, education, and health). The study finds that the debt-
servicing constraint is liable to shift public expenditure away from the social sectors (health and 
education) and possibly from public investment. Similarly, Fosu (2010) extends this analysis for sub-
Saharan Africa, using a reduced-form simultaneous equations model. The study finds that debt servicing 
has a negative impact on social sector spending, particularly on education.   
Sinha, Arora, and Bansal (2011) used panel data regression to investigate the determinants of 
public debt for middle and high income group countries for the periods 1993 to 2008 for high income 
group countries and 1980 to 2008 for middle income group countries. The results show that government 
expenditure and GDP growth are the only two variables that significantly affect total debt of the middle 
income group countries while for High income countries, GDP growth is only variable that significantly 
impacted on debt. 
Mah, Mukkudem-Petersen, Miruka, and Petersen (2013) estimates the effect of government 
expenditure on debt in Greece using the vector error correction model framework and granger causality 
model with annual data from 1976 to 2011. The findings of their paper reveal a significant negative 
relationship between gross government debt and gross national income as well as gross government 
debt and net foreign direct investment. A significant positive relationship was also found between gross 
government debt and gross national expenditure and gross government debt and inflation. In addition, 
the results also show that past values of gross national expenditure and gross national income have the 
predictive ability to determine the present value of gross government debt. 
Kgakge-Tabengwa (2014) investigates the implications of shocks to public debt and 
government expenditure on the development of human capital and growth within a model that explicitly 
recognizes the role of fiscal constraints through introducing the government budget constraint for a set 
of selected developing countries1 from 1980-2013. The results reveal that high stocks of public debt, 
beyond the 30-40% debt/GDP threshold, depress the effect of human capital on output growth through 
limiting government expenditure resources available for developing human capital. The study conclude 
that developing countries which face fiscal challenges such as high public debt and poor revenue 
prospects to back government expenditure sustainably, cannot solely develop human capital based on 
the strength of their domestic resources, underscoring the need for specific supportive global fund for 
human capital development. The study recommends the setting up of public debt management strategies 
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and efficient government expenditure management frameworks supported by sustainable revenue 
prospects to provide fiscal sustenance impetus to enhance the growth process in developing countries. 
Odo, Ogonna, and Anoke (2014) investigated the causal relationship between total public debt 
and public expenditure in Nigeria from 1980 to 2015 using Johansen co integration test and vector error 
correction model. The results of the study indicate that there is a long run relationship between 
government expenditure and public debt while the VECM result indicate that government capital and 
recurrent expenditure has significant positive relationship with public debt in the Nigerian economy 
implying that government borrowing in Nigeria is triggered by government deficit budgeting. The study 
recommends the re-examine of government budgeting process in order to ensure that allocative 
efficiency is achieved in our budgeting system and that borrowing to finance budget deficit must be 
done objectively and realistically. 
Oladokun (2015) empirically examines the causal relationship between Public Expenditure and 
National Debt in Nigeria for the period spanning 1980 to 2012 using the ordinary least square estimation 
technique. The results of the study indicate that a causal relationship between public expenditure and 
domestic debt implying that government borrowed to finance their recurrent expenditure. The concludes 
that high level of corruption, misappropriation of public funds, and poor administration has impeded 
the growth of the public sector while inadequate investment has been to provide infrastructural facilities 
that can boost the revenue generating capacity of the country so the country can operate a balanced or 
surplus budget. 
Shabbir and Yasin (2015) examines the impact of public external debt on social sector spending 
for seven developing Asian countries for the period 1980 and 2010. The panel dataset includes Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Empirical analysis of the study 
was based on three interrelated equations for different spending categories, which are estimated using 
the general method of moments (GMM). The findings confirm the common wisdom that outstanding 
external debt and its servicing liability have an adverse impact on public spending, particularly on social 
sector spending. This study recommends that developing countries need to mobilize their own resources 
and minimize their dependence on external borrowing. 
Uguru (2016) empirically investigates the relationship between public debt and government 
expenditure in Nigeria from 1980 to 2013 using the ordinary least square regression technique. The 
results revealed that there is a positive significant relationship between public debt and government 
expenditure in Nigeria. The study recommends that government should make haste to reduce its 
recurrent expenditure and embark more on capital expenditure so as to meet the Vision 20:2020. Also, 
the government should diversified the economy away from crude oil in order to reduce the tendency of 
the government accumulating public debt.   
Šimović (2017) analyzed the impact of public debt level and (un)sustainability on fiscal 
spending effectiveness in Croatia for the period 2001 to 2015 using switching regression and SVAR 
approach. The results of the study show a negative impact of recession on public debt sustainability and 
confirm the main thesis that public debt level significantly affects and reduces the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy in Croatia. 
 Alawneh (2017) estimates the impact of capital expenditure, current expenditure and external 
and internal public debt on taxes in Jordan during the period 2001–2014 using the ordinary least square 
estimation technique. The statistical analysis showed a statistically significant, positive impact of both 
the capital expenditure and the current expenditure on taxes. The study also found a statistically 
significant, positive relationship between external and internal public debt on taxes in Jordan. The study 
recommends the need to use non-traditional alternatives to finance capital expenditures instead of 
external public debt. Thus, internal sources such as Sukuk Murabaha Islamic participation should be 
used to finance capital expenditure for the Government to build schools, hospitals and other government 
services.       
 
3.1. Conceptual Framework 
This presents conceptual framework concerning the mode of structural, functional and legal 
operations between the Debt Management Office (Act), Fiscal Responsibility Commission (Act), 
Federal Ministry of Finance and the National Assembly on whether the transition from a discretionary 
to a rule-based fiscal system as implied by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 has taken place in 
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terms of public debt management in Nigeria. The strategies adopted and the institutional arrangements 
in place were inadequate to achieve a sustainable debt regime for Nigeria. This is because public debt 
management responsibilities were diffused across several agencies and operators, leading to ineffective 
and poor coordination of debt management functions. However, a clear legal framework is necessary 
for making appropriate institutional arrangements for public borrowings. This should cover legislation 
for borrowings by the government, for its own use or on-lending. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
acts as an agent of government for external borrowing. The legislation has to be supported by 
regulations and procedures which defines the explicit roles of the different agencies: Debt Management 
Office and Federal Ministry of Finance (DMO and FRA) involved in loan operations at all stages of the 
“loan cycle” for each category of borrower. Legislation covering the issue of government guarantees 
by the Federal Ministry of Finance (MOF) on behalf of the government, and criteria and procedures for 
their approval and monitoring are also required. These functional, operational and structural 
relationships are explicitly explained with the aid of the following Figure 1 below: 
 
                 (OPERATIONS) 
 
 
           OPERATIONS                   OPERATIONS  
 
 
        (LEGAL) 
 
 
 
     (LEGAL)       (LEGAL) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Institutional, Functional and Structural Relationships 
 
Source: Extract by the Researcher (2018) 
 
 
The Debt Management Office (DMO) was established in October, 2000, with the mandate of 
managing the country’s external and domestic debt. Part III, Section 6 of the DMO Establishment Act, 
2003 provided the legal framework for its operation. The Office has power to: Issue and manage Federal 
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 
COMMISION 
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF 
FINANCE 
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                       (STRUCTURAL) 
 
         REVENUE 
 
        DEFICIT 
 
FISCAL RESPONSIBILTY 
ACT (2007) 
DEBT MANAGEMENT 
OFFICE ACT (2003) 
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PUBLIC DEBT   
 
PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE 
LEGISLATURE 
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Government loans publicly issued in Nigeria upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed between 
the Federal Government and the Office; Issue, from time to time, guidelines for the smooth operation 
of the debt conversion programmes of the Federal Government; the Act also empowers the office to 
issue periodic guidelines to regulate the conduct of external and domestic borrowing as approved by 
the Federal Executive council (FEC) and the National Assembly (NASS). 
The Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC) on the other hand, is charged with enthroning a 
regime of prudent, ethical and effective management of public monies and resources across all tiers of 
Government. Thus, the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) on its part establishes the Fiscal Responsibility 
Commission. It provides that the federal Government shall set a limit on the consolidated debts of the 
Federal and State Governments. Any Government that exceeds such limit will be denied further 
borrowing until the excess is reduced. Conditions for borrowing under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
include legislative approvals for the loans and their purposes, cost-benefit analysis and the application 
of loans.  It is this obligation that is usually the pitfall of government in its debt management. The 
Nigerian public is also very skeptical about government’s ability to meet with the very vital obligation 
in borrowing as several billions of borrowed monies have ended up being looted (This day, 2005).  
 
3.2. Methodology 
This study has situated within institutional and macroeconometric framework. The Debt 
Management Office Act of 2003 and the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 provided the context for the 
institutional analysis. The two Acts of Parliament provided the conditions for borrowing and for the 
utilization of borrowed funds as well as the incentive system for government agencies involved in 
procuring and managing public debt. The mini macroeconometric frame allows for analysis of the 
impact of public debt on public sector block in the economy (see for example Garba, 1995a). 
 
         According to Garba (1995b), the budget constraint function is important because it helps to show 
the linkages between fiscal policy, debt policy, domestic credit and money supply. Thus: 
 
BD GE GRR           1 
 
Where: BD is Budget deficit, GE is Government Expenditure, and GRR is Government Retained 
Revenue.  
 
The budget deficit could be negative (Deficit), Zero (Balance) or positive (Surplus). And it could be 
financed by a combination of domestic borrowing (DB) or external borrowing (EB). Algebraically: 
 
BD DB EB 
         2 
 
Where: BD is Budget Deficit, DB is Domestic Borrowing, and EB is External Borrowing 
 
Consequently, the functional equations in the public sector block are specified as follows: 
 
( , )GE f TDS GRR          3 
( )GRR f FCR          4 
 
The total public debt in the economy, therefore, comprises of the domestic and external debt. And this 
can be expressed as: 
 
TD DD ED 
         5 
 
The above identity can be specified as the functional equations of the total debt, as follows: 
 
2 )( , RDD f GE M          6 
7 
 
)( , , ,ED f EXR GE DEXIT DUMMYABACHA          7 
 
The debt exit (Dexit) was introduced as an explanatory variable because this is considered as a resource 
to the economy that improves on its liquidity position and should therefore increase consumption as an 
injection to the economy, which leads to higher income and increases government expenditures. 
Furthermore, the total debt service (TDS) in the economy broke down into domestic debt service and 
external debt service. And its identity can be expressed as: 
 
TDS DDS EDS           8a 
 
However, data on DDS and EDS are not available for the entire period. We, therefore, introduce 
equation 8b to relate debt service with debt shock. This can be expressed as: 
 
( , , , )TDS f DD ED DEXIT EXR          8b 
 
Equation 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8b can be expressed in log form as: 
 
0 1 2 1log loglog t t t tGR TDSGE                                        9 
0 1 2loglog t t tFCRGRR                                   10 
20 1 2 3 3log loglog tt t t tRGE MDD                                      11 
0 1 2 3 4 4log loglog loglog t tt t t tDEXIT DUMMYABACHAGE EXRED                               12 
50 1 2 3 4log loglog loglog t tt t t tDEXIT EXRDD EDTDS                                              13 
 
Where: LOGGE is Log of Government Expenditure, LOGRR is Log of Government Retained Revenue, 
LOGDPE is Log of Gross Domestic Product Expenditure, LOGDD is Log of Domestic Debt, LOGED 
is Log of External Debt, LOGTDS is Log of Total Debt Service, LOGEXR is Log of Exchange Rate, 
LR is Log of Interest rate, LOGM2 is Log of Money Supply, LOGFCR is Log of Federally Collected 
Revenue, LOGDexit is Log of dummy of Debt exit, and Ui is Error Term. 
 
3.3.   Data and Estimation Techniques 
       The data used in establishing a model in this research are annual time series for the period of 1970 
-2013. The main sources of data used in estimating this model are Central Bank of Nigeria statistical 
bulletins and annual reports, annual reports and statement of accounts of the Debt Management Office 
(DMO), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and cognate publications. The ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) augmented with the lag value of the dependent variable to account for first order serial correlation 
was adopted as the estimation technique for this study. Recall that, the main aim of the study is to 
examine the impact of Public Debt Management in Nigeria: the role of institutions after the exit from 
the Paris Club in 2006.  
      
4. Presentation of Empirical Results 
4.1. Analysis of Transition to Rule-Based Fiscal Operations 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 set out a framework intended to improve fiscal discipline, 
allocative, efficiency, transparency, accountability, value for money principle as well as public 
participation in the management of federal resources. Therefore, the conceptual framework in Figure 1 
as each shows the institutional, functional and structural relationships of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 2007 in Nigeria. It is in an attempt to correct these fiscal system anomalies and level of compliance 
to the provisions of fiscal operations as indicated in the Fiscal Responsibility Act which further 
empowers the Fiscal Responsibility Commission to ensure the implementation of all the provisions in 
Section 41 and 42 which elaborately established the framework for debt management as shown in Table 
1.  
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Table 1: An Assessment on Compliance of Transition to Rule-Based Fiscal Operations 
 
ELEMENTS  
 
PAR
T  
 
SECT
ION 
 
HEADINGS 
LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE 
HIGH 
COMPLIA
NCE 
MEDIUM 
COMPLIA
NCE 
LOW 
COMPLIA
NCE 
1. 
Establishment      
and 
Empowering 
of New Fiscal 
Organization 
I 1 -10 Establishment,  
 
Functions and 
Fiscal 
Responsibility 
Council and  
 
Governing 
Board 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
2. Fiscal 
Policy           
Framework 
and 
Fiscal Policy 
Instrument 
II 11 – 
17* 
The Medium 
Term 
Expenditure 
Framework 
    
III 18 -
24** 
The Annual 
Budget 
    
3. Fiscal 
Rules 
IV - 
XI 
25 -27 1. Budgetary 
Planning of 
Corporations 
and Related 
Agencies 
    
29 – 
35* 
2. Budget 
Executions 
and 
Achievement 
of Targets 
[Rules] 
    
36 – 38 3. Public 
Revenue 
    
39 – 
40** 
4. Savings and 
Asset 
Management 
[Rules] 
    
41 – 
45* 
5.Public 
Expenditures 
[Rules) 
    
46 – 48 6.Debt and 
Indebtedness 
    
49 -51 7. Borrowing     
53 -55 8. 
Transparency 
and 
Accountability 
    
4. Offenses 
and 
Penalties 
XII 56  Offenses and 
Penalties 
    
Source: Extracted from the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, 2007 
 
9 
 
Summarily, the assessment in Table 1 reveal that, there are four elements of the assessment of 
the transition to rule-based fiscal operations: the establishment and empowering of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission (FRC), fiscal policy framework and fiscal policy instruments, fiscal rules, 
offences and penalties.   
The next portion of the Act and probably the most important aspect is the level of compliance 
with the provision. In this, it was categorically stated that there is high level of compliance in 
establishing the office, while the Functions of the Fiscal Responsibility Commission were low 
compliance and the governing board was very low. 
Secondly, Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) serves as a mandatory basis for 
yearly budgets. It provides for the process of articulation and approval of both the MTEF and the annual 
budget and sets out rules and guidelines for borrowing, debt management, national savings and assets 
management, control of public expenditure and specific obligations that seek to improve public 
participation, transparency and accountability. However, compliance with the provisions of this law 
remains low. Thus, measures to be undertaken by the Budget Office of the Federation and the Ministry 
of Finance include early commencement of MTEF and Budget Processes, providing good lead time and 
adequate publicity for public consultations on budgets and MTEF. 
On fiscal rule No. 8 as mentioned in Table 1, the levels of compliance are very low except in 
the case of public revenue, which has a medium level of compliance. This was due to the fact that there 
were revenues coming from sales of crude oil and little from non-oil sector. The level of compliance on 
Offenses on non-adherence is very low and hence nobody was punished to serve as detriment to 
potential offenders and this were in spite of the clarity in the provision of Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(FRA) on offences and penalties.  
 
4.2. Regression Estimation Results and Analysis  
 
Table 2: Estimated Results for the Public Sector Block  
EQUATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Log(GE) 
 
Log(GRR) 
 
Log(DD) Log(ED) Log(TDS) 
C 1.41*** 
(3.94) 
1.64* 
(2.29) 
-0.13 
(-0.36) 
 -1.54 
(-1.01) 
Log(FCR)  0.82*** 
(16.20) 
   
Log(M2)   0.91*** 
(3.03) 
  
Log(DD)     0.69*** 
(3.01) 
Log(ED)     0.20 
(1.46) 
Log(TDS) 0.20*** 
(4.98) 
    
R   1.89** 
(2.25) 
  
 
Log (EXR)    0.17 
(0.50) 
0.23 
(0.92) 
Dexit    -0.03 
(-0.01) 
0.52 
(0.26) 
Log (GE)   
 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.50 
(1.28) 
 
Log (GR) 0.72*** 
(11.86) 
    
DUMMYABACHA    
 
-0.02 
(-0.001) 
 
DUMMYGFC     -0.34 
(-0.96) 
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AR (1)   0.42** 
(2.66) 
      0.65*** 
(5.13) 
         
0.96*** 
(12.04) 
0.20 
(1.27) 
SIGMASQ       0.04*** 
(4.29) 
      0.03*** 
(3.76) 
       0.25*** 
(4.44) 
    0.24*** 
(4.76) 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.97 
Source: Compiled by Researcher using E-views econometrics software Version 9.0 
NOTE: Values in parenthesis are t-values and ***, ** and * denotes statistical significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% Level respectively 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated results for the public sector, which has five equations. The model 
is good fit of the data as adjusted (R2) ranges from 0.97 – 0.99 implying that, at least 97% of the 
variations in the endogenous variables are explained by the linear inferences of the explanatory 
variables.   
Equation 1 is the model of government expenditure. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient 
are in accordance to apriori expectation. The R2 of 0.97 indicates that the model is good fit. For instance, 
it implies that 97% of the variations in government expenditure is explained by the endogenous 
variables included in the model. It was further identified that government revenue and total debt service 
have a positive and significant impact on government expenditure; where autoregressive AR(1) were 
included in the equations to eliminate autocorrelations and heteroscedasticity.   
Equation 2 is the model of government retained revenue. The sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient are in accordance to apriori expectation. The R2 indicates that the model is good fit. For 
instance, the finding from the government retained revenues shows that, a one per cent increase in 
government retained revenue has a positive and significant impact on federally revenue collected; while 
autoregressive (AR(1)) and SIGMASQ are both positive and significant and were used to eliminate 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
  Equation 3 is the model of domestic debt. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients are in 
accordance with apriori expectation. The R2 indicates that the model is good fit. For instance, an 
examination of the regression result shows that the coefficients of money supply (M2) and government 
expenditure are 0.91 and 0.06 per cent respectively indicates a positive relationship with Domestic Debt. 
Interest rate shows a high magnitude (1.89), which implies that interest rate, has a strong positive 
influence on the domestic debt. This is plausible since the need for rollovers amidst high interest rate 
significantly raise the debt stock.   
Equation 4 is the model of external debt. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient are in 
accordance to apriori expectation. The R2 indicates that the model is good fit. However, the result 
revealed that, there were positive relationship between government expenditure and exchange rate, i.e. 
higher external debt means more government expenditure and exchange rate depreciation. Looking at 
the regression results, it shows that, the coefficients of government expenditure are 0.17 and 0.50 per 
cent respectively indicates a positive relation with external debt. In addition, the Dummy’s coefficients 
of Dexit and Abacha decreased by about 0.03 and 0.02 per cent respectively indicate that on the average, 
external debt was significantly lower during these period .   
Equation 5 is the model of total debt service. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient are in 
accordance to apriori expectation. The R2 indicates that the model is good fit. For example, a one per 
cent decrease in total debt service led to 0.69, 0.20, 0.23 and 0.52 per cent in domestic debt, external 
debt, exchange rate and Dexit respectively. This result shows that, domestic debt, external debt, 
exchange rate and Dexit has a positive relationship with total debt service. This means that, the more 
we service our debt the more our exchange rate depreciated. The Coefficient on DUMMYGFC 
indicates that TDS was on the average lower during the global financial crisis between 1998 and 2004.  
AR (1) and SIGMASQ were included in the model to eliminate problem of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity.   
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5. Conclusions Remarks 
Based on the findings, it is concluded that, the transition from the discretionary to a rule-based fiscal 
system/operation has not effectively taken place. This is largely because the rules and provisions 
provided in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 did not translate to strict compliance with the 
provisions. Secondly, efficient and effective of public debt management from the work has not been 
achieved. This was because of conflicting interests between the Debt Management Office (DMO), 
Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC) and the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF). The asymmetrical 
relationship with the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) as superior to the heads of the Debt 
Management office (DMO) and Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) limits their ability to efficiently 
discharge their mandates. As a result, Nigeria’s public debt has not been given proper scrutiny from 
2007 - 2013. Thus, based on the research findings, this study recommends that the government should 
strictly comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria on borrowing as is contained in the guidelines of DMO Act and FRA. 
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